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Abstract 
 
The 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic cost over £8billion 
and was one in a succession of crises to strike the British food and 
farming industries.  This paper examines the institutional response to 
FMD and the processes of inquiry that followed.  It argues that the 
institutional response to the disease was too tightly focussed on 
agricultural interests.  Moreover, subsequently, a highly 
compartmentalised approach to lesson-learning nationally has 
concentrated on certain aspects of the crisis, with the result that important 
lessons, of a more holistic and integrated nature, risk being overlooked. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The UK food and farming industries have suffered a succession of crises 
over recent years.  The most recent has been the Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) epidemic in 2001, but this has followed major public health scares 
concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in 1996 and 
salmonella in eggs in 1988.  It has been estimated that expenditure on 
dealing with problems such as BSE, FMD and classical swine fever has 
been at least £15billion (Royal Society, 2002, p.131).  Each crisis is 
followed by efforts to learn lessons.  Lesson-learning can take a variety of 
forms.  The BSE crisis was the focus of an extensive public inquiry that 
took from January 1998 to October 2000 (BSE Inquiry, 2000).  Cross-
party Parliamentary Select Committees may investigate crises, as they did 
with the salmonella-in-eggs affair (House of Commons Agriculture 
Committee, 1989).  Special commissions may be established or, more 
commonly in recent years, ‘task forces’ may be called into action. 
 
FMD dominated agriculture and the countryside for much of 2001.  The 
first case was confirmed on 20th February 2001, the day after it had been 
suspected in pigs at an abattoir in Essex.  At least 57 farms had already 
been infected by the time the disease was first confirmed (National Audit 
Office, 2002, p.1).   The volume of animal movements at this time of 
year, coupled with the fact that the disease had not been identified for at 
least 10 days at the farm in Northumberland considered to be the most 
likely source of the outbreak, were the reasons for the extensive initial 
infection.  By the time the disease was finally eradicated at the end of 
September 2001, more than six million farm animals had been 
slaughtered.  The direct cost to the public sector has been estimated at 
over £3 billion, with the cost to the private sector estimated at over £5 
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billion (National Audit Office, 2002, p.1).  At the height of the crisis, in 
mid-April, more than 10,000 vets, soldiers, field and support staff, and 
thousands more working for contractors, were engaged in fighting the 
disease, and more than 100,000 animals were being slaughtered and 
disposed of each day. 
 
This paper presents an analysis of the institutional response to FMD and 
the process of learning the lessons from the crisis.  It first discusses the 
nature of policy learning, and the role of crises in triggering policy 
change.  It then sets out the background to, and key features of decision-
making during the FMD crisis.  Finally, it considers the processes of 
lesson-learning that were set in train in 2001.  The paper draws upon 
personal interviews conducted with key actors involved in the crisis.  
These included ministers, civil servants, scientists, representatives of 
farming, countryside, tourism and other public bodies, and members of 
the Government’s Rural Task Force.1   
 
POLICY LEARNING AND CRISES 
 
Until the 1980s, studies of public policy change generally adopted an 
institutionalist approach that saw government as an essentially passive 
actor driven by external social pressures and conflicts.  However, 
increasing interest in processes of ‘policy learning’ began to call into 
question this view of policy change.  Bennett and Howlett identify three 
                                                          
1
 This project, entitled “Learning Lessons from the Foot and Mouth Crisis”, was 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (award number R000223758) 
and ran from November 2001 to April 2002.  Approximately 20 interviews were 
conducted during this period.  We would like to thank the ESRC for funding the 
work, the interviewees who gave of their time to be interviewed, and the participants 
at a research seminar in London who commented on the research findings and on a 
draft of this paper. 
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distinct types of learning: government learning; lesson drawing; and 
social learning.  Some characteristics of these types are shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1:  Types of Learning 
Learning type Who Learns? Learns what? To what effect? 
 
Government 
Learning 
 
 
State Officials 
 
Process 
related 
 
Organizational 
change 
 
Lesson Drawing 
 
 
Policy 
Networks 
 
Instruments 
 
Programme 
change 
 
Social Learning 
 
 
Policy 
Communities 
 
Ideas 
 
Paradigm shift 
 (Source: Bennett and Howlett, 1992)2  
 
Prominent among current approaches to policy learning is the ‘Advocacy 
Coalition Framework’ (see, for example, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993).  This approach is based on the view that alliances with coherent 
mutual interests and values (termed advocacy coalitions) can emerge 
from within a policy community and influence the community’s 
direction.  Notably, the approach calls for the study of policy change over 
the medium term — say ten or more years — to gain sufficient 
perspective on any learning processes at work (Sabatier, 1993).   
 
 
                                                          
2
 There is a debate in the policy studies literature on the precise definitions of policy 
communities and policy networks (see, for example, Dowding, 1995).  They were 
originally used interchangeably, but policy networks have come to be seen as 
relatively small groups of political actors, while policy communities have come to be 
seen as more extensive entities, distinguished by some commonality of interest and 
sharing a common culture and understanding. 
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Nevertheless, relatively short-lived perturbations, or ‘focusing events’, 
may mobilize coalitions and thus induce change in the policy process 
(Kingdon, 1995; Birkland, 1998).  A crisis can be just such an event 
(Birkland and Nath, 2000).  Kingdon (1995) has used the ‘garbage can 
model’ to examine the role of focusing events in the policy process.  The 
model was first put forward by Cohen et al. (1972) in their celebrated 
article “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice” which sought 
to explain decision making in organizations.  What they particularly 
addressed was how solutions adopted by organisations are not 
specifically devised for the problems they purport to solve.  This 
argumentation was widely discussed in the social sciences for its 
challenge to prevailing notions of the rationality of organisational 
behaviour, and was the start of the development of other theoretical 
frameworks taking irrational decision making into account (e.g. Kingdon 
1995). 
  
Cohen et al. argue that an organization “is a collection of choices looking 
for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which 
they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be 
the answer, and decision makers looking for work” (1972, p.2).  That 
means that, in an organization, problems and solutions are not necessarily 
related to each other in a simple linear or deductive relationship.  This 
arises from the specialisation of tasks within organisations.  Various 
individuals within an organisation have the role to develop solutions.  
Normally these solutions are not needed and are therefore shelved (i.e. 
disposed of in the garbage can).  At any particular point in time an 
organisation also faces or pursues an array of problems which it must 
characterise or prioritise, or, alternatively, avoid or neglect (i.e. dispose in 
the garbage can).  The garbage can, therefore, typically contains various 
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potential solutions and various potential problems for the organisation.  In 
the model, the garbage can is seen to act as a reservoir on which 
organisational decision making can draw.  The outcome therefore 
depends on the mix in the can.  Solutions and problems have an equal 
status as separate streams in the organisation.  Which solutions are ready 
for airing and which problems are on people’s mind are critical.  When a 
given solution is proposed, the participants may regard it as irrelevant to 
the problem.  Or, even more likely, the participants have fixed on a 
course of action and cast about for a problem to which it is the solution.  
So, a given solution is looking for a problem. 
 
Garbage can theory was initially developed to explain decision-making 
within organizations.  Several studies have subsequently applied the idea 
to the analysis of the national political system as an organization (e.g. 
Kingdon 1995).  One important insight is that a crisis can be a significant 
event in accelerating (or hampering) reformist agendas, because of the 
way it disturbs the balance of power between pro-and anti-reform 
coalitions. 
 
The next section of the paper briefly sets out the chronology of the 2001 
FMD crisis and highlights its key characteristics.  These are, first, that 
contingency planning was insufficient to cope with the unprecedented 
scale of the outbreak.  Second, the scale of the subsequent epidemic was 
in part a function of changes to the structure of the livestock industry in 
which public policy was implicated.  Third, in the initial stages of the 
outbreak, the problem was approached as almost wholly an agricultural 
issue of animal health, with the consequence that the measures taken to 
address the issue precipitated a much wider crisis in local rural economies 
beyond farming. 
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THE CHARACTERISTICS AND CHRONOLOGY OF THE 2001 
CRISIS 
 
Provisions for FMD control come under a European framework.  Under 
Directive 90/423 all Member States are required to prepare an FMD 
contingency plan.  The UK’s plan was endorsed by the European 
Commission in 1992, and is subject to regular updates, the most recent 
prior to 2001 being in July 2000.  Local contingency plans also 
complement the national plan.  Despite meeting accepted international 
standards these plans and procedures proved inadequate in 2001.  
Contingency planning was based on the likelihood of there being a 
maximum of 10 FMD cases at any one time, but the initial scale of the 
2001 epidemic was far greater.  The Commission’s own worst case 
scenario for contingency planning is for 150 cases in an outbreak.3 
 
Since the previous serious FMD outbreak in 1967, the UK sheep sector 
had undergone major changes which exacerbated the 2001 epidemic.  The 
number of sheep and lambs in the UK had risen by almost 50 per cent, to 
more than 42 million in the intervening period (Royal Society, 2002, 
p.11). The Common Agricultural Policy’s sheepmeat regime, in 
particular, stimulated a marked growth in sheep numbers between the 
early 1980s and the mid-1990s.  Sheepmeat regime rules encourage 
farmers to have the full quota of sheep for which they claim subsidies 
during the inspection period in February/March.  As a result, a much 
greater volume of stock is bought and sold between farmers, with sheep 
often subject to several moves between different livestock markets in 
quick succession.  The scale of sheep movements were even a surprise to  
                                                          
3
 Dr Iain Anderson, oral evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 23 July 2002, Q.4. 
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MAFF.  The Ministry initially under-estimated their scale, and had to 
revise their estimate to Number 10 in the early days of the outbreak from 
one million movements to two million (Lessons to be Learned Inquiry 
Report, 2002, p.30).  
 
The day after FMD symptoms were spotted at the abattoir in Essex, FMD 
was confirmed and the European Commission was informed of the 
outbreak.  The Commission banned all meat and live animal exports from 
the UK the next day, in accordance with EU legislation.  This decision 
itself was immediately viewed as another blow to an already beleaguered 
farming industry.  The Guardian’s headline of 22nd February summed up 
the public and political weariness felt beyond the farming community: 
“Farms: yet another crisis”.  There was an urgent need to stamp out FMD 
and return to farmers their ability to export.  With confirmed cases of 
FMD over 250 miles apart, the Minister of Agriculture, Nick Brown, 
imposed a ban on all livestock movements.   
 
Retrospective analysis, co-ordinated by the Chief Veterinary Officer, 
traced the most likely route of early infections.  This suggested that 
Burnside Farm, a pig-finishing unit in Northumberland, was the index 
case.  The virus is thought to have arrived at Burnside in meat or meat 
products fed to the pigs, possibly as early as January 26th.  Infected pigs 
from Burnside were sent to Essex on February 8th and February 15th and 
16th.  Stock on nearby Prestwick Hall Farm in Northumberland (and on 9 
other local premises) were infected by airborne virus.  Infected sheep, not 
yet showing any outward signs of disease, were sent to Hexham Market 
from Prestwick Hall Farm on February 13th.  These sheep were sold to a 
Lancashire-based dealer who took them, along with 174 others, to 
Longtown Market for sale on February 15th.  Spread of the disease 
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proceeded through movement of stock, people and equipment.  On the 
14th and 15th of February at least 24,500 sheep passed through Longtown 
Market, with 181 purchasers involved in the sales (DEFRA, 2002).   
   
The extent of the crisis became apparent over the following days as FMD 
was confirmed in Devon (25th February), Wales (27th), and Cumbria 
(28th).  At this stage, the focus was entirely on the plight of the livestock 
farming industry.  A MAFF news release on February 22nd urged the 
public to “postpone unnecessary visits which might bring them into 
contact with livestock farms”.  Other organisations acted likewise to limit 
the risk of disease spread.  On February 23rd the Northumberland 
National Park Authority erected signs closing all footpaths within the 
Park.  The following day, the Lake District National Park Authority 
introduced a voluntary ban on the use of its footpaths.  On February 27th, 
local authorities - who already had powers to close footpaths in Infected 
Areas (minimum 10km radius round cases of the disease) - were given 
emergency powers to close all footpaths and rights of way throughout the 
Controlled Area (defined by the Commission Decision as the whole of 
Great Britain).  The first case in Scotland was confirmed in Dumfries and 
Galloway on March 1st.  With outbreaks confirmed across Britain, vets 
began to be drafted in from overseas to help the over-stretched State 
Veterinary Service.   
 
MAFF issued guidance to local authorities on how to use their footpath 
closure powers: most were already putting in place blanket closures.  In 
desperation, the Cumbria Tourist Board sent information to all of its 
members stating that it was still possible for visitors to come to Cumbria 
on holiday.  However, many events and attractions across the country 
succumbed to the general close down.  On March 8th it was announced 
 10 
that the Cheltenham Festival had been cancelled to prevent the spread of 
FMD.   
 
On Sunday March 11th, Nick Brown stated that the epidemic was “under 
control”.  That day, the Independent on Sunday and Observer reported 
that losses to tourism were far outstripping those to the farming industry.  
On March 14th the Prime Minister announced that he was setting up a 
Rural Task Force that would report to him on the immediate and long-
term implications of FMD for the wider rural economy.  The first meeting 
of the Rural Task Force - incorporating representatives from a wide range 
of central Government departments, local and regional government, 
business, tourism and other rural interests - took place that day. 
 
In the second half of March, faced not only with the rapid progression of 
the disease, but also with the gathering evidence of a deepening crisis in 
rural areas, the Government stepped up its crisis management measures.  
On March 15th Nick Brown announced that all animals within 3km of any 
infected farm in Cumbria would be slaughtered to create a firebreak to 
prevent further spread.  On March 20th the Prime Minister began daily 
interdepartmental briefings, and Michael Meacher announced the first 
short-term relief measures for businesses affected by FMD.  
 
On 21st March the first meeting took place of an ad hoc group of 
epidemiologists, informally established by the Chairman of the Food 
Standards Agency, that would go on to form the core of the FMD Science 
Group advising the Prime Minister.  A short briefing following the 
meeting stressed the importance of reducing the time between 
identification and culling of Infected Premises and Contiguous Premises.  
That evening, a member of the group, Professor Roy Anderson, said on 
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BBC’s Newsnight programme that, in a scientifically quantifiable sense, 
the FMD epidemic was “out of control”, thus seeming to contradict what 
the Minister of Agriculture had said ten days earlier.   
 
The following day the Government opened the Cabinet Office Briefing 
Room (COBR) to oversee disease control and strategy.  COBR brought 
together representatives from all relevant Departments and was chaired 
initially by either the Prime Minister or Secretary of State for Defence.  
On March 23rd teams of epidemiological modellers from Imperial College 
and Edinburgh University reported their initial results.  The next day, 
Tony Blair asked David King, his Chief Scientific Advisor, to assemble a 
group of scientific advisors, and the formal FMD Science Group met for 
the first time on the 26th.  On March 27th, following the Group’s initial 
advice, Nick Brown confirmed in Parliament that new slaughter targets of 
24 hours for Infected Premises and 48 hours for Contiguous Premises had 
been agreed.  During the week March 21st – 27th, the Prime Minister 
effectively took personal control of disease strategy arrangements, 
advised via the Chief Scientific Advisor by the teams of epidemiologists.   
On March 28th MAFF, in conjunction with DETR, issued new guidance 
on access and a (voluntary) code for walkers, and DCMS issued guidance 
on opening tourist attractions.  Opening up the countryside was now a 
priority.  Government was also exploring alternative disease control 
options.  On March 29th a vaccination seminar was held at Number 10.  
 
On April 2nd, Tony Blair announced that local elections (and by 
implication the General Election) would be delayed from May 3rd until 
June 7th.  Throughout April the media focus of the crisis shifted back and 
forth between farming and disease control and other rural interests.  On 
April 8th, Nick Brown wrote to livestock farmers advising them on what 
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steps they themselves should take to reinforce biosecurity.  There was 
also growing impatience with footpath closures in some quarters.  The 
Ramblers’ Association complained on April 9th that 90 per cent of rights 
of way in disease free areas were still closed.   
 
On 3rd May the Prime Minister gave a press briefing on progress with the 
disease.  He acknowledged that it had been “a difficult time for the 
country”, but gave assurances that “we are getting the disease under 
control …. We are on the home straight”.4  The following week, on May 
9th, he announced that a General Election would be held on June 7th, and 
FMD began to fade from the national news.  With the control measures 
apparently working, the continuing transmission of FMD was 
increasingly blamed on poor biosecurity.  May ended with the Prime 
Minister refusing to commit to a full public inquiry into the epidemic and 
its handling.  On June 8th, however, the newly returned Prime Minister 
did announce the creation of a new Department of Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to replace MAFF.  Other than Ministerial 
changes, the MAFF/DEFRA changeover made little difference to the 
personnel involved in managing FMD.  The new Department did 
combine the old MAFF with some former DETR functions, including 
rural economy issues, promotion of countryside access and conservation.  
It thus encompassed both the disease fighting and the opening-up-the-
countryside arms of central government. 
 
The end of July saw a localised flare up of FMD, which led to the placing 
of a Restricted Infected Area - the so-called ‘blue box’ - around Thirsk in 
Yorkshire.  Within a blue box strict biosecurity restrictions were imposed 
                                                          
4
 Number Ten Downing Street web page, 3rd May 2001. 
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and locally enforced.  On August 7th, a Restricted Infected Area was 
placed around Penrith in Cumbria, followed on the 26th by another around 
Hexham and Allendale in Northumberland.  The new outbreaks had not 
been predicted by the epidemiological forecasts but with the disease no 
longer raging across the country control efforts could be concentrated on 
these localities.  On September 1st DEFRA Minister Lord Whitty publicly 
ruled out the use of vaccination.  The last confirmed case of the disease 
was on September 30th which brought the final total of confirmed cases of 
infected farms to 2,026. 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO THE DISEASE AND 
CRISIS 
 
The initial institutional response to the outbreak was to see the problem 
wholly in agricultural terms.  With hindsight, it is clear that this narrow 
view set in train a process of decision-making and a set of disease control 
measures that not only wreaked havoc on non-agricultural businesses and 
rural communities, but also locked the government into a course of action 
from which retreat, to accommodate a wider perspective, became very 
difficult.5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 The analysis in this section draws upon several sources.  First, the published reports 
from the various national inquiries contain much description and analysis of who did 
and said what.  Second, the cd-rom published with the report of the Lessons Learned 
Inquiry is a particularly useful source.  It contains pdf files for 550 submissions from 
interested parties, 62 notes of meetings between the Inquiry and the key people 
involved in the crisis, 36 notes of meetings with local and regional stakeholders, and 
22 government publications.  Third, the first author of this paper served as a member 
of the Rural Task Force and so was able to observe its work first hand. 
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The agricultural focus to disease control 
 
Reacting to FMD as purely an agricultural problem meant that the control 
strategy was that demanded by the agricultural community, and other 
interests were marginalised.  This point is well illustrated by the decisions 
surrounding footpath closure.  When asked by the Lessons Learned 
Inquiry about footpath closure, Nick Brown pointed to pressure from 
farmers nationally and locally as an important influence on the closure 
decision.6  The NFU was calling for widespread closure.  In the first week 
of the outbreak, on February 27th, NFU President Ben Gill said: 
 
“It is imperative that every local council which has rural 
footpaths and rights of way within its boundaries closes them 
immediately.  There must be a blanket ban across the country 
…. I implore everyone again: please, please stay away from 
the countryside” (quoted in the Lessons Learned Inquiry 
Report, p.63). 
 
On the same day the same message came from the Prime Minister.  In his 
internet broadcast he said:  
 
“...though we are not at direct risk from this disease, we can 
play a part, unknowingly, in spreading it.  FMD is a highly 
infectious virus which can be picked up by us on our boots, 
clothes and cars and carried many miles.  By staying away 
from farmland, by keeping off any footpaths through or next to 
farms or open land with livestock, we can help the efforts to 
eradicate this disease.  We are giving local authorities today 
the power to enforce the temporary closure of footpaths and 
rights of way, but we hope people will voluntarily stay away in 
any case” (quoted in Rural Task Force, 2001, para 6.4). 
 
                                                          
6
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Nick Brown, Baroness 
Hayman and Joyce Quinn, 22 April 2002, para.29. 
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Official advice from MAFF was more qualified.  A circular on 6th March 
constituted the first formal guidance to local authorities.  It said “[Power 
to restrict access outside Infected Areas] should only be used where there 
is evidence ... that to allow such unrestricted access would pose a 
potential risk of spreading the disease.”  However, in the House of 
Commons on 28 February, Nick Brown, Minister for Agriculture, said “I 
deliberately left the issue to the discretion of local authorities, on the 
understanding that they would know best the local circumstances.  It is 
for them to make an assessment of risk. ... Incidentally, if they want 
advice from me, I suggest that they act on a precautionary basis” 
(Hansard, 28 February 2001, Col. 921, quoted in Rural Task Force, 2001, 
para 6.5).  
 
Of course, the public were keen to ‘do the right thing’ and people 
generally did stay away.  A host of organisations closed sites or cancelled 
events.  One former MAFF civil servant explained later that “whether a 
County Council closed its paths quickly became a symbol of their 
‘support’ for the beleaguered farming community”.7 
 
Former DETR officials explained to the Lessons Learned Inquiry that 
their Department had not been consulted on the decision to give local 
authorities powers to close footpaths, although they acknowledged that 
the decision had not been contentious at the time. 8   An agricultural 
imperative over-rode all other concerns.  The Countryside Agency, the 
body with statutory responsibility for advising government on 
                                                          
7
 Submission to the Lessons Learned Inquiry by Dudley Coates (Lessons Learned 
Inquiry cd-rom, Submission Ref. 416.pdf, para. 3. 
8
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Genie Turton & Chris 
Dunabin (ex-DETR), 25 April 2002, para.3. 
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countryside access issues, was also not consulted.9  (Interestingly, the 
Inquiry was unable to pinpoint the audit trail for the decision on footpath 
closures).   
 
The note of Iain Anderson’s meeting with MAFF Minister Elliot Morley 
reveals the influence of farming interests upon MAFF at the time.  
Morley acknowledged the close relationship between MAFF and the 
farming unions and disputed the view that MAFF had been detached from 
the industry.  The note reports his explaining that “the NFU had almost 
open door access - much more so than was the case with any other 
organisation with any other Department”.10  
 
The Countryside Agency’s first public input into the FMD crisis was on 
1st March when it issued a press release drawing attention to wider rural 
economy impacts.  This foray was not welcomed by MAFF.11  It was only 
after Sunday newspaper reports on 11th March, 20 days into the crisis, 
that the potential impacts on tourism and other rural businesses began to 
attract wider attention.  Yet an agriculturally-dominated perspective 
continued.  Even when the Joint Co-ordination Centre was established in 
Page Street on 26th March, the NFU were represented at the Centre but 
there was no representation of interests from the wider rural economy 
(Lessons Learned Inquiry report, 2002, p.106). 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Richard Wakeford, 22 May 
2002, para.2. 
10
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Elliot Morley, 8 May 2002, 
para.29. 
11
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Richard Wakeford, 22 May 
2002, para.3.(See also Lessons Learned Inquiry Report, p.64). 
 17 
In the aftermath, the Permanent Secretary of MAFF/DEFRA 
acknowledged that the crisis did raise the question as to whether the trade 
off between controlling the disease and the impact on the rural economy 
had been adequately considered.12  He later accepted that there could 
have been earlier inter-departmental consideration of the costs and 
benefits of the control strategy across the rural economy.13 
 
The Role of the Rural Task Force 
 
By mid-March, it was becoming apparent that MAFF was not getting on 
top of the disease, and press and public criticism mounted. Until then, 
media coverage had been fairly factual and supportive of the 
Government’s disease control efforts.  However, coverage became more 
critical and hostile.  According to Alastair Campbell, “‘the farming 
community’ became a lodestone for opinion in the countryside, and any 
semblance of media balance was lost”.14  As officials struggled to cope, 
many mistakes and blunders were made, leading to widespread charges of 
heavy-handedness and much public resentment in affected rural areas.  At 
the same time, it also became apparent that businesses dependent on 
tourism and visitors to the countryside were beginning to suffer badly 
from the movement and access restrictions in place.  Indeed, their 
financial losses proved far greater than those incurred by the farming 
sector.  What had started as an animal disease problem was fast becoming 
a rural economy crisis. 
                                                          
12
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Brian Bender et al, 26 April 
2002, para.46. 
13
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Brian Bender et al, 17 May 
2002, para.131. 
14
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Alastair Campbell, 29 April 
2002, para.6. 
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There was clearly a strong political need to reassert the Government’s 
authority and to redouble the eradication efforts.  This was done through 
the Prime Minister taking personal charge of the disease control 
campaign in late March.  Soon after, the animal cull was extended and 
intensified and the army was brought in to speed up the slaughter and 
disposal of animals.   
 
This more concerted response by government could not quell the rising 
public disgust and anger at the consequences of the ruthless measures that 
were being taken.  There was little that the Government could do to 
respond directly to these wider concerns in the midst of the eradication 
campaign.   Instead, it was locked into a course of action which 
demanded that efforts to stamp out the disease should be pursued with the 
utmost vigour.  Attempts to consider alternative control strategies, 
particularly vaccination, met with strenuous opposition from the NFU.  
There could really be no turning back, whatever the short-term damage to 
tourism interests, the rural economy, the image of the countryside and 
public credulity.  What sustained Ministers in this stance was the promise 
that radical change would follow the ending of the epidemic. 
 
Indeed, at the end of the first week of the outbreak and before the build 
up of criticism of the government, the Minister of Agriculture had 
announced a radical review of agriculture once the outbreak was over 
(The Times, 1st March 2001) and the Prime Minister had promised “a new 
deal for farming” (The Times, 2nd March 2001).  In the meantime, the 
Government had to keep various potential critics on board.  It did so by 
setting up a Rural Task Force.  The Prime Minister announced the 
establishment of the Task Force on 14th March following representations 
by Ewen Cameron, Chairman of the Countryside Agency.  Its remit was: 
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“To consider the implications of the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease 
for the rural economy, both immediately and in the longer term, and to 
report to the Prime Minister on appropriate measures” (Rural Task Force, 
2001, p.7). 
 
Environment Minister Michael Meacher chaired the Rural Task Force, 
which included representatives from a range of central government 
departments and agencies, local and regional government, and business, 
tourism, conservation and other rural interests.  It met weekly at first, 
then fortnightly.  It became a forum in which to bring forward 
information on the scale and ramifications of the impact of the crisis, 
discuss short-term relief measures for affected businesses and 
communities, co-ordinate efforts to re-open the countryside and promote 
the return of visitors, and review plans for rural recovery. 
 
Despite its title, the Task Force was not allowed to interfere with the 
conduct of the FMD campaign.  In effect, the rural economy issues, 
which everyone had come to acknowledge, were “parked” for the 
duration.  What was lacking was any overall means of integrating the 
conduct of the rural economy crisis and the farm crisis.  Genie Turton, a 
senior DETR official, used a wartime metaphor to characterise the 
segregated approach.  According to the note of her meeting with the 
Anderson Inquiry, “there had been some confusion between the battle and 
the war.  COBR had direct links to the disease control front line but had 
not been designed to step back and take a look across all fronts”.15  
Arguably, this ensured no distraction or deviation from the single-minded 
pursuit of disease control.   
                                                          
15
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Genie Turton & Chris 
Dunabin (ex-DETR), 25 April 2002, para.12. 
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The dual approach involved more than simply segregation, however, for 
where conflicts arose, the disease control imperative prevailed.  For 
example, at early meetings of the Rural Task Force, members repeatedly 
requested that the Government bring a veterinary specialist to explain the 
scientific basis of the advice that visits to the countryside be discouraged, 
and to help establish suitable means of risk assessment to allow footpaths 
and visitor attractions to be re-opened as soon as possible.  The initial 
response from MAFF was that the vets were too busy fighting the disease 
to spend time in discussion with the Task Force.  A second example of 
the disease-control imperative prevailing over other concerns was when 
the Prime Minister visited Cumbria.  Despite the anxieties among tourism 
interests about media images of the disease control campaign repelling 
visitors, and particularly foreign visitors to the UK, it was decided that 
Tony Blair should be filmed and photographed wearing protective 
overalls emphasising the disease control and biosecurity imperative, at 
the expense of the concerns about rural tourism.     
 
After mid-March, therefore, the political management of the FMD crisis 
at the national level involved two parallel, but largely separate, policy 
networks.  The first one managed the disease eradication campaign.  The 
chief organisations involved - MAFF, the State Veterinary Service and 
the National Farmers’ Union (but not the Army) - were subject to ever 
more intense vilification as the number of livestock slaughtered rose 
relentlessly.  The second network oversaw remedial measures and 
recovery programmes for affected rural areas.  It included the Rural Task 
Force and other rural organisations at the local and regional 
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levels16.  Some of them - such as the National Trust, the Countryside 
Agency, the National Park Authorities, the Regional Tourist Boards and 
the Regional Development Agencies - played an important ‘delivery’ role 
in helping to re-open the countryside or implement remedial 
measures.  Previously they had played only a minor or peripheral role in 
agricultural policy.  Now, with the legitimacy of what had been the core 
of the traditional agricultural policy network hollowed out, they came to 
constitute a new network for a policy field that had previously lacked 
coherence - rural policy.   
 
It was clear where Ministers wanted to stand in this changing political 
landscape.  With the number of FMD cases falling sharply in May, the 
Prime Minister called an election.  The Labour Manifesto declared:  
 
“Labour is committed to support our countryside and the 
people who live and work in it.  We are committed to create 
a new department to lead renewal in rural areas - a 
Department for Rural Affairs.” 
 
Straight after the election in June, the Prime Minister announced the 
creation of a new Department for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs and the abolition of MAFF.  Margaret Beckett was to be the new 
Secretary of State.  The manifesto commitment to review the position of 
the farming and food industries was fulfilled in August when the Policy 
Commission on the Future of Farming and Food was set up. 
 
Since the crisis, it has been widely argued by the ‘rural policy network’ 
that concerns about the wider impacts of disease control strategies should 
                                                          
16
 The RTF was serviced by DETR officials, with only very limited MAFF 
involvement.  The measures to assist non-farming businesses were developed by 
DETR, working with DCMS, DTI and the Treasury.   
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have been better taken into account.  Treasury officials commented to the 
Anderson inquiry that the misconceived dominance of agriculturally-
oriented perspectives on rural economies had already been well set out in 
the report to the Prime Minister on rural economies by the Performance & 
Innovation Unit in 1999.17 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE LESSON 
LEARNING PROCESS 
 
On 9th August 2001 the Government announced that three independent 
inquiries would examine issues related to the FMD outbreak - the lessons 
to be learned from the outbreak and its handling; scientific questions on 
disease prevention and control; and the future of the farming and food 
industries (see Figure 2).  The first inquiry was chaired by Dr Iain 
Anderson and involved a secretariat of 11 staff based in the Cabinet 
Office and drawn from across Government.  Its focus was on the 
Government’s handling of the crisis and the institutional and policy 
lessons to be learned.  The second inquiry, by the Royal Society, was 
chaired by Sir Brian Follett and involved a Committee of 15 further 
members with specialist scientific and industrial expertise.  Its objective 
was to review the scientific issues relating to the prevention and control 
of infectious diseases in livestock and not just FMD.  The third inquiry 
was chaired by Sir Don Curry and involved a Policy Commission of nine 
further prominent figures drawn from farming, the food industry, 
conservation and the consumer movement.  Its remit was to advise the 
Government on measures to improve the economic and environmental 
sustainability of the farming and food industries. 
 
                                                          
17
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Richard Brown & Michael 
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In evidence to the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs Select Committee, Margaret Beckett explained the Government’s 
preference for three separate inquiries - a “regular mish-mash”, according 
to one member of the committee 18  - rather than a single, full public 
inquiry.  She argued that the three separate inquiries were preferable on 
grounds of speed, cost and quality. 
 
“I think many of the people who say we should have a full 
public inquiry … perhaps have not fully taken on board that 
there is a very specific legal identity for what is properly 
called a full public inquiry which involves very substantial 
amounts of time, very substantial amounts of public money, 
and very often people are not as satisfied with the outcome as 
they thought they would be when they called for a public 
inquiry because it takes longer than they had hoped and it is 
not as conclusive as they had hoped” (Oral evidence, 17 
October 2001, p.11). 
 
In addition to the three Government-instigated inquiries there have been 
several others.  At the national level, the House of Commons 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2002) held an inquiry 
into the outbreak, and the National Audit Office produced a detailed 
study (National Audit Office, 2002).  Aspects of the outbreak have also 
been examined and reported on by the Countryside Agency, the 
Environment Agency, English Nature and the National Farmers’ Union.  
The Agriculture and Rural Development Committee of the National 
Assembly for Wales (National Assembly for Wales, 2002) produced a 
report on the handling of the epidemic in Wales, and the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh held an inquiry into the outbreak in Scotland (2002).  At the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Felicks, 7 May 2002, para2.17-18. 
18
 Oral evidence, 17 October 2001, p.10. 
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European level, the European Parliament established a cross-party 
‘Temporary Committee’ to investigate the 2001 outbreak. 
 
At the local level, several inquiries were called by County Councils.  
First, in October 2001 Devon County Council held a public inquiry.  
Tensions that had arisen between central and local government during the 
outbreak seemed destined to continue to be played out.  DEFRA played 
no part in this inquiry and would not do so in any other local inquiries.   
 
From January 14th–18th Northumberland County Council held its own 
public inquiry into the handling of FMD, prompted by “the absence of an 
urgent and comprehensive Inquiry at national level”  (Report of the 
Inquiry Panel, 2002).  The inquiry’s remit was wide as it sought to deal 
with the scope of the disease in Northumberland, the impacts across the 
rural and regional economy, and the actions of all the agencies involved.  
The second half of the inquiry was intended to be forward thinking in 
order to help devise a full recovery plan.  At the opening of each half day 
session the chairman of the inquiry stressed the absence of representatives 
from DEFRA and the Army - both declined to attend.  The gulf between 
central and local perspectives became a key feature of the inquiry.  
Finally, an inquiry was held by the Cumbria Rural Task Force (a body 
run primarily by Cumbria County Council) with two sets of public 
sessions in May 2002 in Kendal and Carlisle.  The issue of loss of trust in 
public bodies featured prominently. What so offended local people and 
groups was that at the height of the crisis officials had descended into 
their localities and had intruded into their lives, but now remained aloof 
from these efforts to come to terms with what had happened and its 
consequences (Bennett et al., 2002). 
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THE EARLY OUTCOMES OF LESSON LEARNING 
 
The start of the outbreak of FMD and, with it, Ministers’ suggestions that 
they wanted a fundamental review of agriculture once it was over, 
unleashed immediately a crescendo of critical comments and 
prescriptions.  These reiterated or drew upon standard critiques of 
agricultural policy.  Media commentators were quick to assume that FMD 
was another consequence of modern ‘intensive farming’ even though it 
was occurring in the most extensive livestock production systems and 
FMD had been recognised as an animal disease for at least four 
centuries.  There was much debate, though, about what drove ‘intensive 
farming’ which concentrated on most of the usual suspects: the CAP, the 
pursuit of cheap food and the drive for profits in the food chain.   
 
During the early weeks of the outbreak there was considerable 
investigative journalism revealing to the public many of the arcane 
practices of the livestock supply chain.  Many commentators seized upon 
the large-scale movement of live animals as being behind the extensive 
spread of the disease.  This touched upon concerns amongst activist 
groups over, for example, animal welfare and local sustainability. 
 
Politicians and members of the public questioned the necessity of moving 
livestock on the scale that was revealed.  MAFF estimated that two 
million sheep had moved about the country in the three weeks before the 
outbreak was discovered.  Possible culprits for causing such apparently 
excessive movements included unscrupulous farmers and animals dealers, 
the complex and manipulable rules for CAP livestock payments, and the 
loss of local abattoirs brought about by a combination of EU hygiene 
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standards and supermarket-led rationalisation of supply chains.  The 
sense that such large-scale movement of stock was not right framed the 
debate about alternatives. 
 
The Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food was charged 
with responsibility for charting a new strategy for agriculture.  The 
Commission was chaired by Sir Don Curry, a livestock farmer with 
strong co-operative agribusiness interests, and included prominent 
members of the environmental and consumer lobbies as well as the Chief 
Executive of one of the largest supermarket chains.  The Commission was 
clearly intended to give direction to the new Department for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.  In some respects, its membership 
represented DEFRA’s new political establishment.  Its deliberations and 
recommendations in effect put a seal of approval on a post-productivist 
consensus for agriculture.  Indeed, despite the Commission’s claim in its 
report to have produced something radically new, it was in fact the most 
recent in a succession of fundamental reviews (at least nine in all) of what 
to do about agriculture and rural policy since New Labour first came to 
power.19  The Curry Commission drew together members and themes 
from these earlier reviews. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Prior to the Curry Commission, previous reviews of rural and agricultural policy 
under the Labour Government included: the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review; 
the UK Roundtable of Sustainable Development study of agricultural and rural policy 
(1998); the Minister of Agriculture’s Agricultural Advisory Group review (1999); the 
Performance & Innovation Unit work on rural economies (1999); MAFF’s New 
Strategy for Agriculture (1999); the Downing Street Summit and Action Plan for 
Farming (March 2000); the Rural White Paper (November 2000); and the second 
Comprehensive Spending Review (2000). 
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Three strands of policy reform are developed in the Curry report.  The 
first is pragmatic and concerns profitability, since “no part of the vision 
… will come about without profit”.  The other two strands are on the 
environment and consumers.  The overriding message is the reconnection 
of all of this; of farmers with their markets and the food supply chain, and 
of consumers with the countryside and how their food is produced. 
 
The process of lesson-learning from FMD has lasted longer than the 
epidemic itself.  After the Curry Commission reported in January 2002, 
there was a long lull whilst the reports of the other inquiries were 
awaited.  The Royal Society’s science report was published on 16th July.  
The report called for improvements to contingency planning, and for 
consideration of emergency vaccination in any future epidemic.  
 
July 22nd 2002 saw the publication of the report of the Lessons to be 
Learned Inquiry, headed by Iain Anderson.  Its “first and central” 
recommendation is as follows: 
 
“The Government, led by DEFRA, should develop a national 
strategy for animal health and disease control positioned 
within the framework set out in the report of the Policy 
Commission on the Future of Farming and Food.  This 
strategy should be developed in consultation and partnership 
with the farming industry and with representatives of the 
wider rural economy” (Lessons to be Learned Inquiry report, 
2002, p.12). 
 
The report presents an analysis of the course and conduct of the crisis.  It 
focuses on the particular context and conditions that led to an epidemic of 
such a scale.   These included the poor state of contingency planning, and 
the extent of animal movements.  Particular attention is also paid to the 
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use of science, calling in the army, whether to vaccinate, and the nature of 
communications and lines of responsibility among those managing the 
response to the outbreak.  Only four pages of the 165-page report are 
given over to the issue of footpath closure.  There is little detailed 
discussion of the wider rural economy impacts, and much that is a 
reiteration of already available material from Government and from the 
National Audit Office.  At the end of the 10-page chapter on the 
economic impact of FMD, the report concludes: 
 
“The way ahead for agriculture, including animal disease 
control, must be seen in the context of an overall strategy for 
the rural economy in which the agricultural sector is but one 
of a number of interests.  In the heat of the 2001 epidemic, 
policy was driven mostly by the urgent needs of the 
agricultural sector.  In longer term planning for future 
contingencies, a wider range of interests must be considered” 
(Lessons to be Learned Inquiry report, 2002, p.139). 
 
It recommends that: 
 
“The interests of all sectors likely to bear the brunt of any 
costs should be properly represented and taken into account 
when designing policy options to control animal disease 
outbreaks” (Lessons to be Learned Inquiry report, 2002, 
Recommendation No. 51, p.139). 
 
The report also recommends that the Government “make explicit the 
extent to which the wider effects of disease control strategies have been 
identified, measured and taken into account in policy decisions” 
(Recommendation No. 50, p.137).  This came after a discussion of the 
human costs, in terms of stress and mental hardship, for the individuals 
and communities affected by the disease. 
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The report is not as detailed as one from a full, judicial public inquiry, 
particularly in its analysis of the actions of key individuals during the 
crisis.  However, it does raise a set of questions (and contains a great deal 
of factual evidence) about the conduct of the crisis.  When Iain Anderson 
appeared before the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs the day after the report was 
published, he was questioned on many aspects of his Inquiry and report.  
The Committee was concerned about the Inquiry’s apparent failure to get 
to the heart of the decision-making process for three key issues in the 
crisis: why it took 25 days to enlist the army, who decided to close the 
countryside, and who made the contiguous cull decision.   
 
There was also particular interest in the Report’s diagnosis of a problem 
with the culture of MAFF/DEFRA.  Anderson had written in the 
foreword to his report: 
 
“Within MAFF, and now DEFRA, I detected a culture 
predisposed to decision taking by committee with an 
associated fear of personal risk-taking.  Such a climate does 
not encourage creative initiative.  It inhibits adaptive 
behaviour, and organisational learning which, over time, 
lowers the quality of decisions taken.  It seems to me that a 
reappraisal of prevailing attitudes and behaviours within the 
Department would be beneficial”  (Lessons Learned Inquiry 
Report, 2002, p.7). 
 
Anderson explained to the Committee that he saw a need for DEFRA to 
be better guided by closer contact with its ‘customer group’, but that it 
was important to recognise that this customer group was the “total rural  
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economy”20 and not just the farming industry.  He also talked of the 
Department needing to be “more deeply engaged in the regions”, and 
argued that the efforts to combat the disease worked better in Scotland in 
part because of better relations between central government and local 
bodies.  The sense of dislocation between the centre and other 
governmental organisations in England was, according to Dr Anderson, 
“a constant refrain”21 during his Inquiry. 
 
The appendices to the report provide an invaluable resource for 
researchers, not least for the notes of who said what to the Inquiry team.  
For example, the note of the meeting with two key ministers, Alun 
Michael and Michael Meacher, sets out the key lessons that they drew 
from the affair.  They argued that: 
 
• The representation of tourist and business interests needed to be 
enhanced 
 
• Aid to businesses should be provided more speedily and effectively. 
(The provision of accountancy advice had often been an effective form 
of support as it enabled a strategic way forward to be identified). 
 
• Pyres should be avoided 
 
• The blanket closures of footpaths should be avoided 
 
• There should be a move away from confrontation and antagonism to 
recognising the dynamic and integrated nature of the countryside 
economy.22 
 
                                                          
20
 Oral evidence, 23rd July 2002, Q38. 
21
 Oral evidence, 23rd July 2002, Q43. 
22
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Michael Meacher and Alun 
Michael, 7 My 2002, para.15. 
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Unfortunately, the recommendations in the Lessons Learned report fail to 
capture most of these wider lessons highlighted by the crisis.   For 
example, the Countryside Agency had argued that the long distances 
travelled by food products and livestock are not compatible with 
sustainable development.  Recent changes in sheep movements had to be 
reconsidered, and coherent regional and sub-regional markets would have 
a wide range of economic and welfare benefits.23 It is not clear that such 
an issue will feature among the lessons learned from the 2001 crisis. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO THE FMD 
CRISIS 
 
A crisis such as FMD challenges fundamental assumptions by revealing 
underlying realities.  What the FMD crisis has revealed above all is how 
much the countryside has changed in recent years and how out-of-date 
were the official and public conceptions of the position of agriculture in 
rural areas that prevailed in the crucial early days and weeks of the crisis.  
The Northumberland Committee that inquired into the 1967 FMD 
outbreak considered solely its impact on the agricultural sector 
(Committee of Inquiry on Foot and Mouth Disease, 1969).  In those days, 
farming played a much more important role in local rural economies.  
Much has changed since then, with the great growth in rural tourism and 
leisure, in counterurbanisation, in the urban-rural shift in employment and 
in the diversification of farm household incomes.  Yet it seems public 
perceptions and official outlooks had not kept pace.24   
                                                          
23
 Lessons Learned Inquiry cd-rom, Note of meeting with Richard Wakeford, 22 May 
2002, para.12. 
24
 Of course, other important differences between the 1967 and 2001 outbreaks were: 
i) the fact that the disease in 2001 had spread very widely before it was first 
identified; and ii) the 2001 outbreak affected more attractive and upland areas 
(Cumbria, North Yorkshire, Devon) where tourism was more significant than in 
Cheshire and Staffs.  
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The general public and Government have been rudely awakened to the 
diversity of the contemporary rural economy and agriculture’s altered 
role within it. Leisure and tourism, manufacturing and services are now 
the mainstays of rural economies.  However, policy and official structures 
have failed to reflect this change, and still largely view rural issues 
through an agricultural lens.  In a crisis, individuals and institutions revert 
to type.  The management of FMD as above all else an animal health 
problem within the livestock industry precipitated a crisis within the rural 
economy - a crisis which could only be dealt with at the time as an 
unexpected and unfortunate side-effect.  The establishment of DEFRA 
and the concurrent shift in political rhetoric from agriculture to rural 
affairs ought to provide the context for the process of learning these wider 
lessons.   
 
The neglect of the rural economy dimension in the formal learning 
process is a worrying indication that this is not yet the case, however.  If 
it is accepted that the (mis)management of an animal disease led to a rural 
economy crisis, then there should be lessons to be learned about the inter-
linkages and interconnectedness of farming and the wider rural economy.  
Yet what the three official inquiry reports have to say on these holistic 
questions about interconnectedness is extremely thin - banal even.  The 
key issue of interdependence is insufficiently addressed through the 
official lesson-learning process.  From our analysis, we would conclude 
with the following six lessons on the institutional response to the disease, 
and to the process of lesson-learning. 
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Response to the Disease and Effects 
 
1) Disease control / wider rural economy interface: It is generally 
acknowledged that, in the early stages of the epidemic, disease control 
dominated the Government's response to FMD and insufficient 
consideration was given to the impacts of the disease control strategy 
upon economic and social life in rural areas and beyond.  Even after the 
establishment of the Rural Task Force, the management of disease control 
and farmer compensation, on the one hand, and wider rural recovery on 
the other, were conducted separately and with insufficient priority 
accorded to the latter. 
  
2) Central dictat vs local knowledge: FMD control in England relied on 
central dictat which over-rode or bypassed local structures but was 
insensitive to local complexities and differences (e.g. in farm structure, 
disease dynamics and the make up of local economies).  In contrast, a 
more collaborative and consensual approach operated within the devolved 
structures in Scotland.  Irrespective of the relative effectiveness in disease 
control terms (for example, it took three months to eradicate the disease 
in Scotland and seven months in Northumberland), these different 
approaches have produced markedly different levels of controversy and 
discord.  In England, there is a strong sense that the FMD campaign 
severely tested and strained central-local relations. 
 
3) Presidentialism vs ministerial authority: Number Ten’s take-over of 
the co-ordination of disease control, after 22nd of March, is generally 
acknowledged to have improved and accelerated disease control 
measures.  However, it did little to mitigate the agricultural orientation of 
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the overall response to FMD or to join-up disease control with wider rural 
economy / rural recovery issues.  The over-riding priority remained 
stamping out the disease, whatever the short-term consequences for the 
rural economy. 
 
Response to Learning the Lessons 
 
4) Constrained formal lesson learning: The three Government-
established inquiries into FMD were distinct, separate and reductive in 
their focus.  This approach channelled the longer term lesson-learning 
process into fixed trajectories at the expense of dealing with linkages and 
synergies.  In particular, the wider rural economy perspective fell 
between the three stools.  In key respects, therefore, the national inquiry 
process has reproduced the partial and agriculturally-dominated 
perspectives that generated the wider crisis.   
 
5) Central / local contrasts in lesson learning: Local, county level 
inquiries (in Devon, Northumberland and Cumbria) have been open, 
consultative, holistic and (perhaps above all) cathartic processes for those 
involved in, and affected by, FMD disease control.  However the central 
state was notably absent from these inquiries.  In contrast, national 
inquiries have been widely seen (and dismissed) as faceless, distant, 
obscure and conducted mainly within the corridors of power. 
 
6) Curry / DEFRA and the reification of farming: The Curry 
Commission’s focus on farming and food industries was narrow and 
misplaced in the light of the far-reaching consequences of FMD for wider 
rural economies.  The content of the reform agenda that Curry has 
spawned is, in fact, less radical and farsighted than that already 
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tentatively underway in early 2001 within MAFF before FMD struck.  
The risk is that the re-badging of MAFF as DEFRA could actually 
conceal a re-consolidation of an agricultural focus. 
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Figure 2 – The Three Inquiries into Foot and Mouth Disease 
 
Inquiry Policy Commission on the Future of Farming 
and Food 
Scientific Review by the Royal Society Inquiry into the Lessons to be Learned 
from the Foot and Mouth Disease 
Outbreak of 2001 
Chair Sir Don Curry (Northumberland farmer and 
former chair of the Meat and Livestock 
Commission). 
Professor Brian Follett (University of Oxford 
and former Vice Chancellor of the University of 
Warwick). 
Dr Iain Anderson (former senior executive 
member of the Unilever Board and adviser to 
the Prime Minister on millennium compliance 
issues). 
Membership Nine other members, with experience of 
business, farming, consumer interests and 
environmental issues, supported by a secretariat 
based in the Cabinet Office. 
A committee of 15 further members, comprising 
veterinary scientists, virologists, epidemiologists 
and representatives of farming and consumer 
groups. 
Dr Anderson, supported by a small secretariat 
drawn from across Government and including 
a secondee from private industry. 
Working methods • Public meetings held in the English regions 
to discuss farming and food issues with 
local stakeholders. 
 
• Sector-specific events with stakeholders 
representing: the food industry; farmers; 
consumers; the environment; and food 
wholesalers and caterers. 
 
• Views solicited from individuals ad 
stakeholder organisations on the issues 
being addressed: more than 1,000 responses 
were received. 
• Committee members formed sub-groups on: 
surveillance and diagnosis; prediction, 
prevention and epidemiology; and 
vaccination. 
 
• Meetings with key individuals and 
organisations, independent scientists and 
representatives of professional bodies, 
including Chief Veterinary Officer, 
Government Chief scientific Adviser, and 
University modelling teams. 
 
• Discussions with international experts and 
representatives of consumer and welfare 
groups. 
 
• Visits to Cumbria, Dumfries and Galloway 
and Wales. 
 
• Open invitations to people to submit views 
and detailed evidence. 
 
 
• Meetings with key individuals, including 
the Prime Minister, and organisations 
involved in handling the outbreak. 
 
• Visits to key regions affected by the 
outbreak to gather information at first-
hand, meet stakeholders and hold open 
public meetings. 
 
• Visits to other European countries to talk 
to key stakeholders about how the 
associated outbreaks were handled. 
 
• Review of documents. 
 
• Invitation to people to submit comments 
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Terms of Reference “To advise the Government on how we can 
create a sustainable, competitive and diverse 
farming and food sector which contributes to a 
thriving and sustainable rural economy, 
advances environmental, economic, health and 
animal welfare goals, and is consistent with the 
Government’s aims for CAP reform, 
enlargement of the EU and increased trade 
liberalisation” 
“To review scientific questions relating to the 
transmission, prevention and control of 
epidemic outbreaks of infectious disease in 
livestock in Great Britain, and to make 
recommendations by Summer 2002”. 
“To make recommendations for the way in 
which the Government should handle any 
future major animal disease outbreak, in the 
light of the lessons identified from the 
handling of the 2001 foot and mouth disease 
outbreak in Great Britain”. 
Issues investigated • What should we expect of the countryside, 
farming and the food sector? 
 
• What is good about farming and the food 
sector at present and what are the problems? 
 
• What factors are driving these good and bad 
aspects? 
 
• What can be done to make things better in 
the short and medium to long term? 
• The research base for identifying present 
and future risks of disease. 
 
• Adequacy of early warning/horizon 
scanning arrangements. 
 
• Availability, scientific efficacy and safety 
of current disease control technology) 
including vaccines). 
 
• Potential for enhanced use of quantitative 
epidemiological models in understanding 
and predicting the spread of disease and the 
impact of policy options. 
 
• Hazards to human health. 
 
• Ethical and/or financial constraints. 
 
 
• Adequacy of contingency plans. 
 
• Effectiveness and timeliness of the 
Government’s response. 
 
• Organisation, co-ordination and 
resourcing of the response. 
 
• Readiness of the farming industry. 
 
• Impact on the wider economy. 
 
• Vaccination (policy issues). 
 
• Alleviation of the economic, social and 
animal welfare impact. 
 
• Effectiveness of communication systems. 
 
 
Timetable 9th August 2001: Inquiry announced 
25th September: Consultations commence 
29th January 2002: Report submitted and 
published 
9th August 2001: Inquiry announced 
11th October: Consultations commence 
16th July 2002: Report submitted and published 
9th August 2001: Inquiry announced 
14th December: Consultations commence 
22nd July 2002: Report submitted and 
published 
Source: Based on National Audit Office (2002, p. 118). 
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